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Exclusion in Bankruptcy of Qualified Retirement Plans in Illinois

This article was edited and reviewed by FindLaw Attorney Writers | Last reviewed March 26, 2008

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With the addition of Section 12-1006(c) to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature created a conclusive presumption that retirement plans qualified under Internal Revenue Code of 1986 are spendthrift trusts. As a result, the author argues, a qualified retirement plan should be excluded from an individual's bankruptcy estate under section 541(c) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts holding otherwise are in error.

  1. INTRODUCTION

    Qualified retirement plans have been subject to disparate treatment in the bankruptcy courts, and thus have been a source of great uncertainty. The cases have varied so much that debtors faced with bankruptcy have had no idea how their qualified retirement plans would be treated.

    However, the Illinois legislature defined the right of an individual to exclude an interest in a qualified retirement plan from the bankruptcy estate by enacting section 12-1006(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which creates a conclusive presumption that the plan is a spendthrift trust under state law (spendthrift trusts ---those in which "the beneficiary--cannot alienate his or her interest---and---does not possess exclusive and effective control" over the trust's distribution and termination (1)---are excluded from the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code (2)). Unfortunately, not all bankruptcy courts that have recognized this presumption, as will be discussed below.

  2. SECTION 12-1006 OF THE ILLINOIS CODE OF PROCEDURE The addition of this section also creates an exemption for qualified retirement plans which, although largely a moot issue, is arguably unconstitutional in the light of the United States Supreme court decision in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc. (3)

    Section 12-1006 was adopted August 30, 1989, and became effective on the same date. (4) It applies to interests in pension plans held by debtors in bankruptcy or other proceedings pending on or filed after the effective date of the Act. (5) The Senate introduced the bill which was signed by the governor, (6) but the House had introduced a similar bill (7) which the governor vetoed. (8) The House bill was identical to the Senate bill in many respects, but provided less protection for the self-employed. (9) The governor indicated that the bankruptcy court decision reached in In Re Dagnall (10) placed retirement plan funds in jeopardy of being used to satisfy creditor claims in bankruptcy cases, and that the new law was intended to protect these plans. (11)

    Section 12-1006(c) provides that "[a] retirement plan that is (i) intended in good faith to qualify as a retirement plan under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as now or hereafter amended---is conclusively presumed to be a spendthrift trust under the law of Illinois." (12) A retirement pension, profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or arrangement, including a retirement plan for self-employed individuals or a simplified employee pension plan. (13) It also includes an individual retirement annuity or individual retirement account. (14)

    Section 12-1006(a) provides that [a] debtor's interest in or right, whether vested or not, to the assets held in or to receive pensions, annuities, benefits, distributions, refunds or contributions, or other payments under a retirement plan is exempt from judgment, attachment, execution, distress for rent, and seizure for the satisfaction of debts if the plan (i) is intended in good faith to qualify as a retirement plan under applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as now or hereafter amended...(15)

  3. ANALYZING THE DISPOSTION OF A DEBTOR'S INTEREST IN A RETIREMENT PLAN UNDER THEBANKRUTPCY CODE

    The bankruptcy courts have generally used a three-tiered analysis of a debtor's interest in a retirement plan. First, a qualified plan will be included in the bankruptcy estate of the debtor under Bankruptcy Code section 541(a). (16) The general rule is that the debtor's estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." (17)

    Second, Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) provides an exception to the general rule by allowing certain restrictions on the transfer of a debtor's interest to be enforceable in a bankruptcy case. (18) Thus "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under [Title 11 of the United States Code, entitled 'Bankruptcy']". (19)

    There are two theories of what constitutes applicable non-bankruptcy law for qualified plans. One is that ERISA (20) prohibits the assignment or alienation of such interests, or requires the plan to prohibit them, and that ERISA qualifies as the underlying, applicable non-bankruptcy law under Bankruptcy Code section 541(c) (2). (21) The second theory is that the trust, which is part of the plan, is a valid spendthrift trust under state law and that the state law qualifies as applicable non-bankruptcy law. (22) It is this second theory (i.e., that state law is the applicable non-bankruptcy law) that is crucial to the interpretation of Illinois Code of Civil Procedure section 12-1006.

    Assuming that Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) does not exclude from the bankruptcy estate the debtor's interest in a qualified plan, the third issue is the exemption under the Code. (23) Code section 522(b) provides for two exemption schemes, one federal and one state, and generally allows a debtor to choose between the two. (24) Section 522(b) reads as follows:

    (b) Notwithstanding Section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this sub-section...

    1. Property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative, (2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law this is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition. (25)

    An important exemption issue arises when the debtor elects the state exemption scheme or is precluded from electing the federal scheme, as in Illinois: i.e., does section 522(b)(2)(A) entitle him to exempt "any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section"? (26) The legislative history of section 522(b)(2)(a) includes a number of the statutes that congress considered to be exempting nonbankruptcy statutes.27 For example, while social security payments and veterans benefits are included, ERISA is not. (28) A thorough analysis of this issue, is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is among the steps necessary to analyze retirement plans in bankruptcy.

    Another issue under exemptions is the debtor's choice between the federal bankruptcy exemption under section 522(d) pursuant to section 522(b)(1) or a state exemption pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(A). (29) The Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with certain exemptions under section 522(d), including the right to receive payments from retirement plans unless the applicable state with jurisdiction does not authorize the debtor to elect any federal bankruptcy exemptions. (30)

    Illinois has "opted-out" of the federal exemptions, (31) so the exemption for retirement plans under 522(d) is unavailable. This leaves only the exemptions available under federal non-bankruptcy law, as outlined above, or under state law. (32) The state law exemption of an ERISA qualified plan interest may arise in some jurisdictions under a statute exempting certain retirement plan interest from the claims of creditors. (33)

  4. THE MACKEY CASE

    An important footnote must precede any discussion of the pre-section12-1006(c) Illinois bankruptcy cases considering qualified retirement plans in bankruptcy. The United States Supreme Court case of Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency and Service, Inc. (34) calls into question whether states have any power to create exemptions for ERISA qualified plans due to the preemption of state by federal law.

    In Mackey, a collection agency sued in a Georgia trial court to garnish the funds of participants in an "employee welfare benefit plan" as defined under ERISA. (35) Under a Georgia statute, the garnishment of funds under an employee benefit plan subject to ERISA were exempt from garnishment. The U. S. Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court in holding that the funds in the plan could not be exempted. The Georgia statue was preempted by ERISA since it purported to regulate garnishment of ERISA funds and benefits, a matter specifically provided for in the federal scheme.

    An analysis of ERISA's preemption provisions showed that Congress had not barred garnishment of employee welfare benefits, even though employee pension benefits were so protected. Because the Georgia statute prohibited that which the federal statute permitted, the state law was in conflict with the federal scheme and was therefore preempted. ERISA section 514(a) preempts "any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by the statute. (36) The fact that the Georgia legislature may have enacted the statute to effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes was not enough to save the state law from preemption. "The preemption provision [of Section 514(a)]---displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements". (37)

    Although the holding is confined to employee welfare benefit plans, its rationale could arguably be applied to any ERISA plan and the issue of federal preemption. This question will be considered below.

  5. OUTCOME OF THE DEBTOR'S INTEREST IN QUALIFIED RETIREMNT PLANS IN A BANKRUPTCY IN ILLINOIS PRIOR TO SECTION 12-1006.

    Before the enactment of Section 12-1006, Illinois bankruptcy courts did not dispose of the debtor's interest in qualified retirement plans uniformly. None of the cases discussed below held that the debtor's interest in a retirement plan was not property of the estate under section 541(c). However, the excludability of a retirement plan under section 541(c)(2) has received much attention and divergence of results. Of the seven Illinois bankruptcy cases cited, four from the central district and three from the northern district, only two, one from each district, found that the debtor's interest in a qualified retirement plan should be excluded under section 541(c)(2) as spendthrift trust.

    In the northern district case of In re Vogel, (38) a debtor sought to exclude his interest in a qualified pension plan funded and maintained by his former employer. The debtor claimed that his interest in the plan met the criteria for a spendthrift trust because it was set up, administered, and funded by his former employer and the debtor could not get distributions without the consent of his wife. The debtor claimed that since the pension plan was not funded with his assets and was managed by trustees beyond his control, and because he could not alienate his interest in it, it qualified as a spendthrift under Illinois law.

    The court determined that section 541(c)(2) was intended to apply to spendthrift trusts that were enforceable under state law. The keyto whether the interest in a pension plan became property of the estate or was excluded as a spendthrift trust depended on the degree of control debtors had over their interest in the plan or their power to get at the cash. The debtor in this case did not need to quit his job to get at the money in the plan, nor did he require permission from the independent plan administrators. He could get at his interest in the plan at any time, without the consent of the plan administrators, if he obtained his wife's permission to withdraw funds.

    The court held that because the debtor could not withdraw the funds without his wife's consent, the pension plan was a spendthrift trust under Illinois law. (39) A third party may set up a spendthrift trust for a beneficiary, using the third party's assets, which names the beneficiary's spouse as trustee, and it will be respected as a spendthrift trust.

    Although factually distinguishable, the central district case of In re Richardson (40) also allowed the debtor to exclude his interest in a retirement plan. Prior to filing bankruptcy, the debtor had been ordered in a divorce proceeding to pay his former wife her interest in his pension plan. When he filed bankruptcy his former spouse was listed as an unsecured creditor. The debtor contended that the pension fund constituted a valid spendthrift trust under Illinois law and was not property of the estate. The court determined that the pension plan was a spendthrift trust because the debtor had no present right to any benefit under the plan until he retired or was terminated by his employer. Also, he was ineligible to receive a lump-sum payment, had made no contributions to the plan, and exercised no dominion and control over the corpus of the fund.

    Other than the two cases cited above, all have come down against excluding the debtor's interest in a qualified retirement plan. The northern district held in In re Di Piazza (41) that the debtor's interest in qualified pension and profit sharing plans could not be excluded under section 541(c)(2). The court examined Illinois case law to determine if ERISA plans are spendthrift trusts. Two cases, Peoples Finance Company v. Saffold, (42) and Christ Hospital v. Greenwald, (43) were distinguished as applying only to whether a judgment creditor could garnish a debtor's pension plan in a state law proceeding. Neither of these cases were precedent for determining whether the debtor's interest in ERISA plans were exempt in bankruptcy, and no other Illinois cases had addressed the issue. The court determined that the debtor's pension plan was not a spendthrift trust under Illinois law because the debtor could reach his contributions at anytime. The profit sharing plan was not a spendthrift trust because the debtor had an unqualified right to withdraw.

    The northern district case of In re Huff (44) dealt with a debtor's interest in the Illinois State Employees Deferred Compensation Plan. The debtor's participation in the plan, was entirely voluntary and the employee determined how much to contribute to the plan, within certain limits. The debtor could receive distribution of the funds at termination of his employment, death, or demonstration of extreme hardship. The plan also contained an anti-alienation provision. The court determined, without discussion, that section 541(c)(2) applied only to spendthrift trusts and that this fund was not excluded.

    In In re Dagnall, (45) the central district considered again whether a debtor's contributions to the Illinois State Employee's Retirement System of Illinois could be excluded. As a state employee, the debtor's participation in the plan was mandatory, and amounts were withdrawn from her wages. She could withdraw her contributions only upon retirement, disability, or termination. Although the plan did not qualify under ERISA, it provided that benefits could not be assigned or alienated.

    Thecourt determined that for the plan to qualify as a spendthrift trust under Illinois law, the debtor must show that she cannot alienate her interest in the trust res, and that she does not possess exclusive and effective control over termination and distribution. Because the debtor was entitled to a refund of her contributions upon termination of employment, she could reach her benefits anytime, and such dominion and control over the trust corpus violated a true spendthrift trust's prohibition against voluntary alienation of any part of the trust's corpus. (46)

    The central district case of In re Sundeen (47) held that a debtor's interest in a Keogh plan could not be excluded from the debtor's estate because it was not a spendthrift trust under Illinois law. The court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had determined that spendthrift trusts are created to provide a fund for the benefit of another and at the same time secure beneficiaries against their own improvidence or incapacity for self-protection. The debtor in Sundeen could terminate her employment and receive all proceeds in the plan, and so the plan was not a spendthrift trust.

    The central district case of In re Silldorff (48) dealt with two debtors' interest in two qualified employee stock ownership plans. Under the plan, the participant could access the vested corpus of her pension by terminating her employment. The participant could also access part of the plan's assets by obtaining a loan or a hardship distribution from either of the plans. There was also an exception to the anti-alienation provision for a domestic relations order. The court determined that these powers prevented the plan from qualifying as a spendthrift trust under Illinois law.

    These cases make it clear that the Illinois bankruptcy courts have not favored qualifying a retirement plan as a spendthrift trust to exclude the assets from the bankruptcy estate. Many of the powers that give flexibility to the retirement plan disqualify it from being a spendthrift trust. The addition of section 12-1006 relieves this problem by creating a presumption that all qualified retirement plans qualify as spendthrift trust, as discussed below.

    Several Illinois bankruptcy cases considered exemption of the retirement plan assets under the old exemption law. Because we now have a new statute, no discussion of that issue is presented here. The old statute, section 12-1001 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provided that &ob;t&cb;he following personal property, owned by the debtor, is exempt from judgment, attachment or distress for rent:

    (g) the debtor's right to receive:

    (5) a payment under any pension plans or contracts, to the extent necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless

    1. such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
    2. such plan or contract does not qualify under Section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408 or 409 of the Internal Revenue code. (49)

    Note that the new statue purports to exempt a qualifying plan in its entirety, rather than just to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any of his or her dependents.

  6. RECENT BANKRUPTCY CASES INTERPRETING SECTION 12-1006

    Several recent bankruptcy decisions have considered section 12-1006 and whether an ERISA qualified retirement plan should be excluded as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. There is a split on this issue among the districts and within the central district of Illinois. In one central district case the court allowed the debtor's interest in a plan to be excluded, and the northern district court stated in dicta that a debtor's pension plan may be excluded where the petition is filed after the effective date of section 12-1006 (August 30, 1989).In the southern district and another central district case the debtor's interest in the plan has been kept in the bankruptcy estate. (50)

    The central district upheld section 12-1006(c) in In re Block (51) and determined that the debtor's interest in a retirement plan was excluded from the bankruptcy estate. In that case, the court determined that Dr. Block's interest in his profit and pension plans were excludable under section 12-1006(c), which creates a legitimate exclusion under Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2). The court determined that it should follow the seventh circuit holding in In re Lefeber (52) which upheld an Indiana statue nearly identical to Illinois section 12-1006. The court recognized an overriding policy interest in protecting pension benefits from creditors.

    The court in Block also acknowledged the precedent set by the northern district in In re Balay, (53) which held that for any bankruptcy case filed after August 30, 1989 (the effective date of section 12-1006), ERISA-qualified plans are conclusively presumed to be spendthrift trusts and can be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. In that case, the debtor had filed his petition before the effective date of the statute, and section 12-1006 was held to be inapplicable.

    In contrast to the above decisions, the central district of Illinois held in In re Wimmer (54) that the debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified employee benefit plan could not be excluded under section 12-1006 because a state law referring to an ERISA plan is preempted by federal law and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. The Court cited the United States Supreme Court decision in Mackey. (55)

    This holding was affirmed by the district court for the central district of Illinois. (56) The court determined that the rational of LeFeber did not establish an exclusion for a pension plan from the bankruptcy estate where the plan has no restriction on transfer and the debtor had 100 percent control. (57). The plan in Wimmer gave the debtor too much access to the assets of the plan and the statute was too broad in allowing any ERISA qualified plan to be classified as a spendthrift trust. The court noted that its holding differed from the holdings in Block and Balaly. (58)

    The southern district of Illinois in In re Kazi (59) has followed Wimmer and held that the debtors' interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan could not be excluded under section 12-1006(c) because it was preempted under federal law and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. However, the debtors were allowed to exempt their interest in the pension plan because the objection to the claim for exemption was not timely filed and the debtors had a "good faith statutory basis for their claimed exemptions." (60) The court did not reach the issue of whether the exemption under section 12-1006(a) should be preempted because the objection was not timely filed.

  7. ANALYSIS OF 12-1006

    The new section 12-1006 is intended to protect pensions, annuities, benefits, distributions, payments, and refunds of contributions against judgment creditors. (61) The United States Supreme Court decision in Mackey arguably invalidates the provision under section 12-1006(a) pertaining to exemption of qualified plans. The point of Mackey is that the provisions of ERISA control the extent to which creditors may get at the assets and distributions from a qualified plan. State law purporting to regulate ERISA plans is preempted by federal law.

    The result is that 12-1006(a) is unconstitutional in both a state law and a federal bankruptcy proceeding. In both cases, ERISA, not state law, controls the alienation and assignment of retirement plans. In a state law proceeding, the debtor's interest would still be safe because Illinois courts have generally held that ERISA provisionsfor alienation and assignment preclude attachment by creditors. However, in the bankruptcy context, the all-inclusive language of section 541(c) has been held to override the ERISA alienation and assignment provisions and bring the assets of the retirement plan into the bankruptcy estate.

    Therefore, in a bankruptcy case, state law exemptions have no effect, and only the federal exemptions in the bankruptcy code are available (i.e., other federal non-bankruptcy exemption, section 522(b(2)(A), and the federal bankruptcy exemptions, section 522(d)). States that have opted-out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, such as Illinois, have no recourse in the exemption area, except for other federal non-bankruptcy exemptions.

    While the exemption part of the statute is probably preempted, the saving grace of new section 12-1006 is subsection (c) which creates a conclusive presumption that a retirement plan (broadly defined to include almost every type) is a spendthrift trust under the law of Illinois. The result is that the retirement plan is excluded under section 541(c)(2) as a valid spendthrift trust under state law as in Block and Balay. The entire retirement plan should therefore be kept away from creditors, despite the holdings in Wimmer and Kazi.

    Section 12-1006(c) avoids the difficult issue presented by Mackey, because it does not conflict with ERISA or the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code allows state law to control what constitutes a spendthrift trust under section 541(c)(2). In addition, 12-1006(c) does not purport to regulate the circumstances under which assets in a qualified plan may be attached. It merely states that a qualified plan will be treated as a spendthrift trust under state law. The issue of exemptions is mooted by the exclusion of the retirement plan assets from the bankruptcy estate.

    As a side note, section 12-1006(c) provides for the exclusion of the assets of the retirement plan, rather than payments or distributions, from the bankruptcy estate. The exemption provision also speaks to payments and distributions from the plan, but as has been discussed, arguably has no effect. This may seem to undermine the protection afforded by the statute, raising the question of how the debtor gets any benefits from the plan. The answer is that a discharge in bankruptcy eliminates the claims of creditors and allows safe distribution from the plan. But, if the debtor does not elect bankruptcy, distributions from the plan could potentially be attached in a state law proceeding. A discharge in bankruptcy would be necessary to protect distributions from the plan under this line of reasoning.

    This analysis has presumed that section 12-1006(c) is itself valid under state law and presumes that there is no constitutional or statutory provision that would give rise to a challenge on this point. This is an issue that will have to await determination in future cases interpreting this legislation.

  8. CONCLUSION

    The divergence of views between the bankruptcy district courts should be resolved by giving full effect to section 12-1006(c) and allowing a debtor to prevent creditors from attaching the assets of the debtor's qualified retirement plan. A qualified retirement plan is conclusively presumed to be a spendthrift trust and is excluded under Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2). The exemption under section 12-1006(a), however, is apparently unconstitutional under the doctrine the United States Supreme Court decision in Mackey.

    1. In re Silldorff, 96 BR 859, 864 (CD Ill 1989).
    2. 11 USCA ss541(c)(2) (1979, Supp 1990).
    3. 486 US 825, 108 S Ct 2182, 100 L Ed 2d 836 (1988).
    4. Ill Rev Stat ch 110, ss12-1006 (1989).
    5. Id at ss12-1006(d).
    6. SB 162, 86th General Assembly.
    7. HB 247, 86th General Assembly.
    8. Governor's Order,September 7, 1989.
    9. Id
    10. 78 Bankr 531 (Bankr CD Ill 1987).
    11. Governor's Order, September 7, 1989.
    12. Ill Rev Stat ch 110 ss12-1006(c) (1989).
    13. Id at ss12-1006(b)(1).
    14. Id at ss12-1006(b)(3).
    15. Id at ss12-1006(a).
    16. Donna Seidman, The Bankruptcy Code and ERISA: Do They Conflict As to Whether A Debtor's Interest In or Rights Under A Qualified Plan Can Be Used to Satisfy Claims and Expenses? 3 Bankr Dev J 1, 27 (1986), citing 11 USC 541(a) (1984) ("Seidman").
    17. Id.
    18. Id at 27, citing 11 USC 541(c)(2) (1984).
    19. Id at 27-28.
    20. 29 USC ss1001 et seq.
    21. Seidman at 30 (cited in note 16).
    22. Id.
    23. Id at 51.
    24. Notes, Exemption of ERISA Benefits Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 83 Mich L. Rev 214, 218 (1984), citing 11 USC 522(b)(2)(A) (1982) ("Exemption").
    25. 11 USCA ss522(b)(1979), Supp 1990).
    26. Exemption at 219 (cited in note 24).
    27. Id.
    28. Id.
    29. Seidman at 51 (cited in note 16), citing 11 USC 522(b)(1) and (d) (1984).
    30. Id.
    31. Ill Rev Stat ch 110, ss12-1001 (1983).
    32. Seidman at 52 (cited in note 16).
    33. Id at 53
    34. 486 US 825, 100 L Ed 2d 836, 108 S Ct 2182 (1988)
    35. Id. 100 L Ed 2d at 842-843.
    36. Id. 100 L Ed 2d at 843..
    37. Id. 100 L Ed 2d at 844.
    38. 78 Bankr 192 (Bankr ND Ill 1987).
    39. Id At 195.
    40. 75 Bankr 601 (Bankr CD Ill 1987).
    41. Bankr L Rep CCH Dec 69,266 (Bankr ND Ill 1983).
    42. 83 Ill App 3d 120, 403 NE 2d 700 (1st D 1980).
    43. 82 Ill App 3d 1024, 403 NE2d 700 (1st D 1980).
    44. Bankr L Rep CCH Dec 70/038 (Bankr ND Ill 1984).
    45. 78 Bankr 531 (Bankr CD Ill 1987).
    46. Id at 534.
    47. 62 Bankr 619 (Bankr CD Ill 1986).
    48. 96 Bankr 859 (Bankr CD Ill 1989).
    49. Ill Rev Stat ch 110, ss12-1001 (1983).
    50. At least two other bankruptcy decisions involve cases which were filed before the effective date of the statute: In re Summers, 108 BR 200 (Bankr SD Ill 1989) (debtor's exemptions determined as of date of bankruptcy filing, without regard to any postpetition modification or amendment to state exemption law); and In re Smith, 115 BR 144 (Bankr CD Ill 1990) (holding in Summers followed). In addition several cases have dealt with the spendthrift trust issue but do not consider the section 12-1006 question and may have some persuasive importance. In re Groves,120 BR 956 (Bankr ND Ill 1990); In re Lyons, 118 BR 634 (Bankr CD Ill 1990); and In re Tomer, 117 BR 391 (Bankr SD Ill 1990) (Indiana law).
    51. 121 BR 810 (Bankr CD Ill 1990) (Bankruptcy Judge Gerald D. Fines).
    52. 906 F2d 330 (7th Cir 1990).
    53. 113 BR 429 (Bankr ND Ill 1990).
    54. 121 BR 539 (Bankr CD Ill 1990) (Bankruptcy Judge William V. Altenberger).
    55. 108 S Ct 2182, 2189 n 12.
    56. In re Wimmer, 129 BR 563 (CD Ill 1991).
    57. 129 BR at 567.
    58. Id.
    59. 125 BR 981 (Bankr SD Ill 1991) (Bankruptcy Judge Kenneth J. Meyers).
    60. Id at 991-2
    61. Governor's Order, September 7, 1989.

    ABOUT THE AUTHOR

    Phillip H. Hamilton is an associate in the firm of Farrell & Long, P.C. of Godfrey, and a certified public accountant. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of Michigan and his law degree from Southern Methodist University. His practice is concentrated primarily in tax controversies.

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