When considering venue issues involving maritime personal injury claims, it is critical to make an initial determination regarding whether the claim will be controlled by maritime law, as opposed to any specific federal legislation such as Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1986 & Supp. III 1989.)
Hebert v. Bradford Marine, 1999 WL 44870 (La. App. 3 Cir.) provides an interesting analysis of this issue. Donald Hebert brought suit under the "savings to suitors" clause in Vermilion Parish against his employer, Bradford Marine, Inc., to recover damages arising from a personal injury which occurred offshore. Hebert was thrown from a vessel onto a platform located within Vermilion Block 46 in the Gulf of Mexico, which is off the coast of Vermilion Parish, Louisiana. The vessel collided with the platform while attempting to dock. The defendant excepted to venue and argued the proper venue was in LaSalle Parish. The plaintiff, Hebert, was a Vermilion Parish domiciliary. The defendant, Bradford Marie, Inc., was a former entity which, at one time, was located in LaSalle Parish, however, at the time of the litigation in question, no longer did business, had no employees and had no assets. When the accident occurred, Bradford Marine, Inc.'s registered office was located in LaSalle Parish.
The district court in Hebert denied the exception of improper venue. On appeal, Bradford Marine cited La. R.S. 49:6 and Union Texas Petroleum v. PLT Engineering, 895 F.2d 1043 (5 Cir. 1990) as being supportive of their position. They argued that the lower court erred in finding Vermilion Parish as a proper venue for an action of an offense or quasi offense which occurred near a platform located on the outer Continental Shelf beyond the gulf ward extension of Vermilion Parish.
La. R.S. 49:6 provides that the gulf ward boundary of coastal parishes extends coextensively with the gulf ward boundary of Louisiana. This would make the gulf ward boundary for Vermilion Parish 3 marine leagues from the coast.
Union Texas Petroleum held that Louisiana procedural law applied to non-maritime contract disputes concerning the construction of a gathering line on the outer Continental Shelf. Union Texas Petroleum cited Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Surety, Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 E.Ed. 2d. 360, (1969), which held that the purpose of the OCSLA was to define a body of law applicable to the seabed, subsoil and fixed structures on the outer Continental Shelf. According to Rodrigue, this law was to be federal law, applying state law only as federal and then only when not inconsistent with applicable federal law. Rodrigue, also went on to note that for adjacent state law to apply as surrogate federal law under the OSCLA, three conditions are significant, to wit: 1) the controversy must arise on a situs covered by the OSCLA (i.e. the subsoil, seabed or artificial structures permanently or temporarily attached thereto; 2) federal maritime law must not apply of its own force; 3) the state law must not be inconsistent with federal law.
In Hebert, the court of appeals noted that the suit at bar was brought under the "savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789. They explained that a claim brought under the "savings to suitors" clause is one which sounds in admiralty and invokes the substantive federal common law as opposed to any specific legislation such as OCSLA. The appellate court observed that the "savings to suitors" clause is a federal grant of "all other remedies which suitors are otherwise entitled" when bringing "any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction", 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1). Claims brought in state court under the "savings to suitors" clause, the appellate court explained, results in federal substantive law being applied but where the result is not substantially affected, the procedural law of the forum applies. The court went on to note that Louisiana's procedural law guides the legal proceedings in its courts and the issue at bar which is procedural question of venue. According to Hebert, the trial court used Union Texas Petroleum in combination with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 74 to conclude that Vermilion Parish was the Parish of proper venue. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 74 provides, in pertinent part, that an action for the recovery of damages for an offense or quasi offense may be brought in the parish where the wrongful conduct occurred or in the parish where the damages were sustained. Article 74 falls within the exceptions to the general venue rules. Hebert would not, by analogy to Union Texas Petroleum, "stretch" La. R S. 49:6 to the Outer Continental Shelf and "stretch" Article 74 to create an unprovided for extension of Louisiana's coastal boundary. Hebert concluded that the appropriate rule of venue is Article 42 (2) which provides that an action against a domestic corporation shall be brought in the parish where its registered office is located. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 85 provides that an action against a domestic corporation, the charter and franchise of which have been administratively revoked by the Secretary of State in accordance with R. S. 12:163, may be brought in any parish where the suit could have been brought prior to revocation. As such, inasmuch as the record of the instant case established that Bradford Marine had a registered office in LaSalle Parish at the time of the accident, the appellate court held that proper venue for this action was in LaSalle Parish.