I. Introduction
The United States Congress is currently considering numerous pieces of legislation that would apply unilateral U.S. economic sanctions against foreign countries and entities. The various legislative proposals seek to penalize a wide variety of conduct, including nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and religious persecution. These legislative proposals are in addition to the many sanctions laws and Executive Orders already in effect. At the same time, however, there are also several sanctions reform proposals before Congress.
Despite the Clinton Administration's pleas for more flexibility in sanctions laws and some Congressional efforts to bring a more coherent approach to sanctions policy, there is little consistency among members of Congress with respect to the sanctions measures currently being proposed and considered. Rather, it appears that members' positions on sanctions legislation are generally dictated by the political concerns associated with each different proposed sanctions regime. This memorandum summarizes and analyzes the most significant sanctions legislation recently passed by Congress, as well as those currently pending in Congress.
II. Recently-Enacted Sanctions Measures
A. India/Pakistan: The Agricultural Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-94, S. 2282)
In May, the Clinton Administration imposed mandatory sanctions under the Arms Export Control Act against India and Pakistan for testing nuclear weapons. The Agricultural Export Relief Act, introduced in the Senate on July 9, 1998 to amend the Arms Export Control Act, provides an exemption from the sanctions against India and Pakistan for certain credits, credit guarantees and financial assistance for exports of agricultural products. The Senate passed the bill unanimously the same day it was introduced. The House approved the Senate's bill on July 14th, but the exemption for agricultural credits was limited to a one-year period. The Senate agreed to the one-year limitation, and President Clinton signed the bill into law on July 14, 1998.
While many of the sanctions reform measures discussed below have languished in Congress for months with little action, this waiver of agricultural credits passed quickly to facilitate a specific wheat purchase, which Pakistan indicated would begin through a tender offer process on July 15, 1998. Without export credit guarantees from the U.S. government, which were outlawed by the sanctions against India and Pakistan, U.S. wheat farmers would have been unable to compete for the Pakistani purchase. Accordingly, under strong pressure from U.S. wheat farmers and active involvement by members from wheat-producing states, such as Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Representative Robert Smith (R-OR), the Congress pushed the measure through very quickly. The Clinton Administration repeatedly expressed its support for legislation to exempt such agricultural credits from the sanctions against India and Pakistan, and President Clinton quickly signed the Agriculture Export Relief Act into law.
B. Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 (H.R. 2709 and S. 1311)
In contrast to the Agricultural Export Relief Act, which loosened the sanctions against India and Pakistan, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 seeks to strengthen U.S. sanctions against Iran by punishing companies and individuals that ship missile technology to Iran. The legislation directs the President to report periodically to specified Congressional committees on foreign persons who have transferred or attempted to transfer goods, technology or assistance that may contribute to Iran's production of ballistic missiles. Although not specifically mentioned, the legislation is targeted at Russian (and Chinese) entities suspected of assisting Iran with its missile program.
With respect to any person found to have provided assistance to Iran, sanctions are to be imposed prohibiting: (1) the sale of items on the United States Munitions List; (2) the export of dual use goods and technology; and (3) the provision of U.S. financial assistance for a minimum of two years. The President is authorized to waive the sanctions if the President determines and reports to Congress that additional information demonstrates that the person did not engage in the sanctionable activity, or that national security reasons justify a waiver.
Title II of the Act includes implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a comprehensive treaty aimed at preventing the development and use of chemical weapons, which the United States has ratified but not yet implemented. Inclusion of the CWC implementing legislation, which President Clinton favors, was meant to force the President to approve the Iran sanctions provisions of the bill in order to ensure passage of the CWC legislation.
The House and the Senate passed the bill with veto-proof majorities. Nevertheless, the President vetoed the bill on June 23, 1998, stating that it would undermine the Administration's efforts with the Russian government to reduce the flow of missile technology from Russia to Iran. Consistent with the Administration's well-established position on unilateral sanctions generally, the Administration also criticized the legislation for requiring the imposition of overly-broad and inflexible sanctions based on very little evidence that a foreign company or individual transferred missile technology to Iran.
A veto override vote in the House was scheduled for the week of July 13th. However, on July 15, 1998, the Administration announced that it would impose trade sanctions on nine Russian companies and institutions that have allegedly been helping Iran with its missile programs. The announcement by the Administration was timed to coincide with a statement by the Russian government that its Export Control Commission was conducting an investigation of violations by the nine entities under the Commission's new "dual-purpose" goods and services export regime. The Administration was successful in getting the House to postpone its override vote. However, reports indicate that the House may still at some future date schedule a vote to override the veto if missile technology transfers to Iran continue. Administration officials are hopeful that they can prevent a Senate veto override and are focusing their efforts accordingly.
These two foregoing pieces of legislation highlight the differences between the Administration and Congress on sanctions issues. Clinton Administration officials, including Secretary of State Albright and Commerce Secretary Daley, have made repeated requests to Congress for flexibility in sanctions policy and a reduction of the number of unilateral sanctions measures imposed by Congress.
Despite some moves in Congress to reform unilateral sanctions measures (as discussed below), many members continue to support sanctions legislation. Moreover, members' positions on sanctions policy vary greatly depending upon the type of sanctions, the target of the sanctions, and the effect of the sanctions on their constituents. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) recently stated that "I suppose there is not a single member of this body, . . . who has been very consistent on this subject. Sometimes members have felt that sanctions were inappropriate except in their particular area of interest where they thought sanctions might make sense."
Congress and the Administration agreed fairly easily to waive agricultural credits for India and Pakistan because of strong pressure from farmers and the view that food exports to friendly nations such as India and Pakistan should not be affected by unilateral economic sanctions. Conversely, many members of Congress believe that the Administration has been too soft on enforcing existing sanctions against Iran and that more specific sanctions against the transfer of missile technology to any unfriendly nation such as Iran is an appropriate use of sanctions. It is difficult to identify a clear trend on sanctions policy--members generally react to proposed sanctions legislation for political reasons rather than any overarching belief about the efficacy of unilateral economic sanctions.
III. Sanctions Reform Initiatives
A. Senate Task Force on Sanctions
In an effort to address the difficult problems surrounding existing and proposed sanctions measures, Senate Majority Leader Lott announced on June 26, 1998, the formation of a sanctions task force to address various issues related to economic sanctions policy. The task force includes Senators from both parties with diverse views on sanctions policy. Senators Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Joseph Biden (D-DE) chair the task force. Members of the task force include Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC), Max Bacus (D-MT), Richard Lugar (R-IN), Christopher Dodd (D-CT), Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), John Glenn (D-OH), Connie Mack (R-FL), John Kerry (D-MA), Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), John Warner (R-VA), Carl Levin (D-MI), Tim Hutchinson (R-AR), Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Pat Roberts (R-KS), and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY).
The task force was charged with making recommendations to the Senate leadership by July 15, 1998 concerning the sanctions against India and Pakistan. The task force recommended that Congress should permanently exempt from the sanctions both private and government loans for agricultural exports to the two countries.
The task force is also supposed to report to the Senate leadership by September 1, 1998 on the following more general questions:
- What constitutes a sanction?
- What sanctions are now in place? What flexibility is provided in these different sancions regimes?
- How should the success of sanctions be assessed? Once sanctions achieve their purposes, can they be removed?
- How should policy goals be defined in considering and implementing sanctions regimes?
- Are there effective procedures in place now to ensure coordination between the executive and legislative branches for the consideration and imposition of sanctions?
- Are effective procedures in place for oversight and monitoring of the executive branch compliance and implementation of existing sanctions?
This list of topics for consideration covers a wide range of issues related to sanctions policy. Moreover, the list demonstrates that the task force will not only consider how to provide flexibilty in the implmentation and posible termination of sanctions, but it will also consider strengthening oversight and monitoring to ensure that the President is properly enforcing existing sanctions. Task force chairman Senator McConnell promised that the task force would work intensely on these issues in order to make recommendations by September 1, 1998, and then propose some legislation in September to implement the recommendations.
The task force faces an extremely difficult task to analyze and make recommendations on the dozens of current and pending sanctions programs by September 1, 1998. Moreover, the task force includes members with nearly polar opposite views on sanctions policy. For example, Senator Lugar has offered legislation to reform the U.S. approach to unilateral economic sanctions, and decrease the number and type of sanctions imposed. Senator Helms, however, continues strongly to favor unilateral sanctions regimes, including comprehensive sanctions against Cuba. Moreover, members of the sanctions task force are divided on the sanctions reform legislation discussed below. Accordingly, it will be difficult for the task force to reconcile these diverse views into a coherent recommendation for sanctions policy.
The creation of the task force is seen by many observers as a political response to pressure from U.S. industry to limit the ever-increasing number of sanctions imposed by the United States. Many industry groups, including USA*Engage and the President's Export Council, continue to argue that the number of sanctions regimes and broad range of sanctions imposed against various countries harm U.S. business interests and do not successfully advance U.S. foreign policy interests. Some view the task force more cynically as a way to appear responsive to the concerns of U.S. business without acutally passing sanctions reform legislation.
B. Proposed Sanctions Reform Legislation
1. Amendment to the Nuclear Proliferation Sanctions in the Arms Export Control Act (S. 2194)
This bill, introduced by Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), would amend the Arms Export Control Act, under which mandatory sanctions were imposed against India and Pakistan. The bill would amend that statute, which currently requires mandatory imposition of sanctions against nations that engage in certain nuclear proliferation activities, by giving the President discretion to impose sanctions. Most important, the bill would apply to sanctions imposed for nuclear nonproliferation before, on or after the date the bill is enacted. Accordingly, if the bill is passed by Congress and the President signs it, the sanctions imposed against India and Pakistan would no longer be mandatory, and the President could rescind them without the Congressional approval currently required.
This bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on June 19, 1998. Senator Roberts introduced this legislation as Amendments 2968-2971 to the Agriculture Appropriations bill (S. 2159), but the Senate took no action on the Roberts amendments.
2. Brownback Amendment on India/Pakistan Sanctions
Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced an amendment to the Senate Agriculture Appropriations bill (Amendment 3155 to S. 2159), which would grant the President the authority to waive many of the sanctions against India and Pakistan for one year. The Senate agreed to this amendment on July 15, 1998. The President would not have the authority under this amendment, however, to waive sanctions regarding U.S. government sales of, and financing for, military goods. Likewise, the President would not have authority to waive export control sanctions. (The Administration stated that it will deny all export and reexport applications for dual-use items controlled for nuclear or missile nonproliferation reasons to all end users in India and Pakistan as part of the current export control sanctions against those countries. However, the Administration also stated that most dual-use exports to entities not involved in missile or nuclear proliferation activities in India and Pakistan will be favorably considered on a case-by-case basis.)
While passage of this amendement illustrates some consensus among Senators that the mandatory sanctions against India and Pakistan may have gone too far, the House must agree to this amendment in conference before it can be approved. It is unclear at this time whether the Brownback amendment allowing a waiver of many of the sanctions imposed against India and Pakistan will be favorably considered in the House and ultimately enacted.
3. The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1998 (S. 2224)
The Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1998, introduced by Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), would authorize the President to delay, suspend, or terminate any form of economic sanctions against any country if the President determines and reports to Congress that the sanctions are not in the best interests of the United States. The legislation defines "economic sanction" very broadly in order to grant the President waiver authority for restrictions on trade, investment, financial transactions, and government economic assistance to U.S. exporters and investors. The waiver authority would not apply, however, to sanctions imposed pursuant to a multilateral regime such as the United Nations resolutions imposing mandatory sanctions against Iraq.
In order to delay, suspend or terminate any sanctions, the President would be required to submit a report to Congress that should contain "a detailed explanation of the events that have occurred to make the imposition or continuation of the sanction not in the United States important national interests." Under the provisions of the bill, the Congress would have authority to override the President's determination to delay, suspend or terminate economic sanctions by enacting a joint resolution disapproving of the President's determination.
This bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on June 25, 1998. While the Senate has not acted on this legislation, the Senate approved an amendment to the Agriculture Appropriations bill introduced by Senator Dodd to exempt food and medical exports from any economic sanctions regime (Amendment 3158 to S. 2159). Specifically, the Dodd amendment would exclude from any existing or future unilateral economic sanctions imposed against a foreign government any restriction or prohibition on exports and financing for exports of food, other agricultural products (including fertilizer), medicines or medical equipment. This amendment addresses concerns raised by U.S. farmers regarding the India/Pakistan sanctions which prohibited credits, credit guarantees and financial assistance relating to the export of agricultural goods. The Dodd amendment would not exclude food and medical exports from sanctions against any country that repeatedly supports terrorism or systematically denies access to food, medicine, or medical care on the basis of political beliefs or as a form of punishment. Because this amendment focused narrowly on food and medicine, it was not considered highly controversial in the Senate. Like the Brownback amendment, however, the House must approve this legislation in conference, and it is unclear at this time whether the House will vote to include the Dodd amendment in the final Agriculture Appropriations bill.
4. Enhancement of Trade, Security and Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act
(H.R. 2708 and S. 1413)
These two bills are identical House and Senate versions of sanctions reform legislation introduced by Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) and Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN). This initiative attempts to establish a framework for considering the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions.
The framework proposed in the Hamilton-Lugar legislation would require any economic sanctions bill to:
- State the foreign policy or national security objectives of the sanctions;
- Provide for termination of the sanctions after two years unless specifically re-authorized;
- Protect the sanctity of contracts entered before the sanctions took effect;
- Give the President authority to adjust or waive the sanctions;
- Target the sanctions as narrowly as possible;
- Minimize the effect of the sanctions on humanitarian activities; and
- Provide for increased export promotion if the sanctions are likely to affect an export market for American farmers.
The bill would also require the Congressional committee considering the imposition of sanctions to request reports from the President assessing the effectiveness of the proposed sanctions. The appropriate committee would also be required to request from the Secretary of Agriculture a report assessing whether exports to the country or countries likely to be sanctioned account for more than three percent of U.S. agricultural export sales, and how those sales will be affected by the sanctions.
H.R. 2708 was referred to the Committees on International Relations, Ways and Means, and Banking and Financial Services on October 23, 1997. It was referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy on November 14, 1997, and the Subcommittee in International Economic Trade and Policy on November 20, 1997.
S. 1413 was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy held hearings on the bill on March 25, 1998. Senator Lugar introduced a scaled-back version of the bill as an amendment to the Agriculture Appropriations bill (Amendment 3156 to S. 2159). On July 15, 1998, by a vote of 53-46, the Senate decided to table the proposed amendment. While Senator Lugar stated that the amendment was necessary to require a more thoughtful approach to sanctions policy, other Republicans stated that the amendment was premature, and that this type of long-term sanctions reform should await the report of the Senate sanctions task force, which is due September 1, 1998 (as discussed above).
5. The Sanctions Implementation Procedures Act of 1998 (S. 2258)
The Sanctions Implementation Procedures Act of 1998, introduced by Senator John Glenn (D-OH), would give the President the authority to delay the initial imposition of sanctions in order either to assist in negotiating an end to the sanctionable activity or to review the potential effectiveness of the sanctions. This delay would be permitted for 45 days, after which time the sanctions would be imposed. During that 45 day period, the President would be required to submit a report to Congress detailing the objectives of the sanctions, any multilateral support for the sanctions policy, the estimated impact on the country to be sanctioned, and the costs and benefits of the sanctions to the United States, and a recommendation, if appropriate, that the sanctions should not be applied. If the President recommends not to apply the sanctions, the Congress would have 15 days to approve that recommendation by joint resolution before the sanctions would take effect.
This bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on June 26, 1998, and no further action has been taken. Many Congressional observers were somewhat surprised that Senator Glenn introduced this legislation since he sponsored the legislation under which sanctions were imposed against India and Pakistan. Moreover, Senator Glenn threatened to filibuster the Agriculture Export Relief Act if it contained broader economic sanctions waiver provisions. Senator Glenn also expressed his continued opposition to the broader waiver authority in the Dodd and Brownback amendments passed by the Senate. Senator Glenn's sanctions reform bill may be an effort to blunt a broader approach to sanctions reform contained in the other proposals outlined above.
IV. Other Legislative Sanctions Proposals
In addition to the sanctions proposals listed above, there are many other significant pieces of sanctions legislation currently pending in Congress.
A. The Freedom from Religious Persecution Act/International Religious Freedom Act
(H.R. 2431, S. 1868)
The Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1998, introduced in the House by Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), attempts to reduce and eliminate religious persecution worldwide. The bill would prohibit federal agencies and U.S. persons from exporting goods to countries or entities responsible for religious persecution. Religious persecution can be either category 1 (where the government conducts the persecution) or category 2 (where non-governmental entities or persons conduct the persecution but are not stopped by the government). The bill also would prohibit giving U.S. financial assistance to such countries or responsible entities. The bill would establish an Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring within the State Department to determine the existence of religious persecution.
The bill would authorize the President to waive sanctions for twelve months on the basis of national security or to achieve the purposes of the Act. The bill provides for sanctions to be terminated if the Secretary of State determines that government-sponsored or government-sanctioned religious persecution no longer occurs within a sanctioned country. In addition, the bill would prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in financial transactions with the government of Sudan because of that country's support of international terrorism and religious persecution.
This House bill was passed by the House on May 14, 1998 and was placed on the calendar for the Senate on July 7, 1998. This bill is controversial because it would impose broad economic sanctions based on an uncertain definition of religious persecution and could conceivably be applied to a large number of countries (even U.S. allies) where some form of religious persecution arguably occurs. The Clinton Administration opposes the measure as overreaching because its annual report already details religious persecution. Moreover, the Administration already has discretionary authority to take actions against nations engaging in such persecution.
The Senate bill (S. 1868) includes many provisions similar to the House bill; however, it provides a wider selection of sanctions that may be imposed and provides the President more flexibility in his decision than the House bill. The sanctions provided in the bill range from public condemnation of the persecuting entity to restriction of U.S. export licenses for all exports to the offending foreign government. Moreover, the President would be required to consult with foreign governments, international humanitarian organizations, and interested U.S. parties before imposing the sanctions. Additionally, the President would have authority to waive the sanctions based on national security or to achieve the purposes of the act. Unlike the House bill, this waiver authority is not limited to twelve-month periods. The Senate bill would also provide for Congressional review of any sanctions imposed or waived.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is scheduled to mark up S. 1868 on Thursday July 23, 1998. There is considerable pressure from the Christian Coalition and other religious groups to enact some legislation concerning religious persecution. Industry groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers strongly oppose the House bill, and are not yet willing to support the Senate bill.
B. China
1. Amendments to the Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3616, Amendments 641 & 642)
Representative Joel Hefly (R-CO) introduced amendment 641 to the House Defense Department appropriations bill. The amendment would prohibit the transfer of any U.S. missile equipment or missile-related technology to China. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) introduced amendment 642 to the same appropriations bill. The Hunter amendment would prohibit the export or re-export of any U.S. satellites to China. Both of these amendments were offered in light of recent allegations that U.S. companies improperly transferred sensitive satellite and missile technology to China.
These amendments were offered and passed the House with large majorities on May 20, 1998. It remains to be seen what support exists for these sanctions provisions in the House-Senate conference on this legislation.
2. The Forced Abortion Condemnation Act (H.R. 2570)
The Forced Abortion Condemnation Act, introduced by Representative Tillie Fowler (R-FL), would prohibit entry into the United States of any Chinese national (including any Communist Party official or Chinese Government official) found to have been involved in the enforcement of population control policies resulting in forced abortion or forced sterilization. The bill would authorize the President to waive the prohibition if: (1) it is in the national interest of the United States; and (2) the Congress is notified in writing.
The House passed this bill on November 6, 1997. The bill was received in the Senate and referred to the Foreign Relations Committee. On June 18, 1998, the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held hearings on the bill.
Senator Tim Hutchinson (R-AR) introduced amendment 3218 to the Senate Defense Appropriations bill (S. 2132), which contains the language of the Forced Abortion Condemnation Act (as well as two other China sanctions provisions discussed below). However, the Senate took no action on the Hutchinson amendment.
3. Political Freedom in China Act (H.R. 2358)
Representative Ileana Ros-Lethinen (R-FL) introduced this bill, which would instruct the Secretary of State to request the immediate release of political prisoners in China and provide access for international humanitarian organizations to such prisoners. The bill would also authorize funds to monitor political repression and to promote democracy in China. The bill would also require the Secretary of State to submit an annual report on human rights in China to the House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations committees and to establish a registry of information on Chinese political prisoners. The bill would also instruct the President to restrict entry into the United States any Chinese government official involved in harvesting and transplanting organs from executed prisoners. Finally, the bill would extend the Congressional review period for licensing nuclear exports to China from 30 to 120 days, and would allow Congress to disapprove nuclear export licenses by joint resolution.
The House approved this bill by an overwhelming majority on November 5, 1997. The bill was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held hearings on the bill on June 18, 1998.
As he did with the Forced Abortion Condemnation Act, Senator Hutchinson introduced the provisions of the Political Freedom in China Act as amendment 3218 to the Senate Defense Department Appropriations bill. Senator Hutchinson's amendment did not include, however, provisions to extend the Congressional review period for licensing nuclear exports to China. As mentioned above, the Senate did not act on Senator Hutchinson's amendment.
4. Clergy Freedom Bill (H.R. 967)
Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) introduced this bill, which would prohibit the use of U.S. government funds to provide travel expenses for certain Chinese officials participating in international conferences. Likewise, the bill would deny admission into the United States to Chinese government officials involved in religious repression. The President may waive this sanction if he determines that to do so is in the national interests and provides written notification to Congress of his decision and its justification. The bill also provides that its prohibitions would cease to have effect two years after enactment of the legislation.
The House passed the Clergy Freedom bill on November 6, 1997 by a large majority. The bill was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held hearings on the bill on June 18, 1998.
Senator Hutchinson also added most of the language of this bill to amendment 3218 of the Senate Defense Department Appropriations bill. The Senate version, however, would prohibit the Secretary of State and Attorney General from using any funds from fiscal year 1999 to admit any Chinese government official involved in religious persecution, rather than requiring a blanket denial of visas for such officials for two years as required by the House bill.
5. Relationship of China Sanctions Legislation to MFN vote
The House voted to accept the President's determination extending most-favored-nation (MFN) status for China on July 22, 1998, which effectively ensures that China will be granted MFN status for another year. The acceptance of MFN for China may be viewed as a way to respond to U.S. business concerns that excessive sanctions against China will harm U.S. business interests and not achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. At the same time, passage of the foregoing sanctions legislation would respond to arguments from U.S. religious groups regarding China's human rights policies, as well as Congressional concerns about China's alleged proliferation activities. Therefore, there is some pressure on Senators to pass some form of China sanctions legislation.
C. The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997 (S. 1344)
The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997, introduced by Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), seeks to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize specific assistance to the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The bill would prohibit such assistance to countries that the President determines are engaged in gross violations of human rights, transferring equipment or technology relating to missiles or weapons of mass destruction, or initiating aggression against other countries in the region. However, the bill would also lift sanctions blocking most aid to Azerbaijan ("Section 907"). Therefore, while the bill contains provisions allowing for sanctions to be imposed based on a Presidential determination, it also reduces existing sanctions against one of the countries.
This bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which approved the bill on June 23, 1998.
D. Other Legislation
There are numerous other pieces of sanctions legislation pending in Congress. For example, the International Child Labor Elimination Act of 1997 (H.R. 2678) would direct the Secretary of Labor to identify foreign countries that do not prohibit child labor and those industries in such countries in which child labor is used, and would restrict U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance to such countries. Additionally, House Amendment 151 to the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act (H.R. 1757) expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should consider applying to Syria the sanctions which are currently enforced against Iran and Libya under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. All of this legislation indicates a continued willingness among members to introduce and support unilateral economic sanctions for a variety of reasons and against a variety of countries and entities.
V. Conclusion
Unilateral economic sanctions legislation continues to be a popular tool among members of Congress. Because members propose and support sanctions legislation for a variety of political reasons, it is difficult to discern an overall policy or ideological trend. It is clear, however, that the Clinton Administration strongly favors reform of U.S. sanctions policy to allow for greater Presidential discretion and will continue to lobby Congress to that end. Several sanctions reform proposals are currently pending in Congress, and there are some members who appear committed to reform. It is most likely that any significant reform of legislative sanctions policy will be delayed until after the Senate sanctions task force makes its recommendations in September. However, the prospects for acheiving a coherent reform proposal from a task force that includes members with divergent views on the use of unilateral sanctions are dim.
This Document is distributed for informational use only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be used as such.