President Clinton did not commit perjury during his deposition in the Paula Jones civil suit under the latest California case applying federal law. In Cabe v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 732, the Court of Appeal held that a person who gives intentionally misleading answers under oath does not commit perjury as long as the answers are literally true.
In Cabe, the defendant was a juror undergoing voir dire. He was asked if "anybody in your immediate family or yourself had been arrested?" The defendant answered, "One of my boys was arrested." It was true that one of the defendant's sons had been arrested; however, the defendant failed to reveal that he had also been arrested. The defendant was charged with perjury based on the false impression given by his truthful, though incomplete, response.
The Court of Appeal ordered the case dismissed. The federal rule established in Bronston v. United States (1973) 409 U.S. 352 construed the federal perjury statute to not apply to false implications that could be drawn from sworn answers that were literally true. Applying the federal rule, the 2nd District Court of Appeal held that a false impression is not a statement, therefore a perjury charge will not lie. In fact, Cabe broadened the federal rule by applying it to a nonadversarial questioning.
Additional case law holds that a witness is under no obligation to volunteer testimony which explains questions which are not relevantly answered or not completely explained, although the answers to questions asked may have left a misleading impression. If counsel fails to ask more specific questions, the witness' failure to volunteer testimony to avoid the misleading impression does not constitute perjury, because the crucial element of falsity is not present in his testimony.
Even if it is assumed that the President intended to mislead his questioners during the deposition, it would not be perjury. Given the extremely narrow definition of "sexual relations" agreed upon by the lawyers in the Jones lawsuit, Clinton's statements that he had not engaged in sexual relations with Lewinsky were true. The misleading impression left by the answer, that he had not had any type of sexual contact with her, was false, but not perjury.
The misleading impression would not satisfy the element of a false statement required under the perjury law. However, should the President be disbarred for this conduct? It should be remembered that Clinton was involved in this litigation as a party, not as a lawyer. The ethical rules that apply to attorneys when acting as legal counsel do not necessarily apply when one is merely being sued. The conduct may disclose a character flaw, but should not subject Clinton, the lawyer, to disbarment.