Reversing an appellate court decision, the Illinois Supreme Court recently ruled that employees may litigate independent tort claims that are actually related to a claim of sexual harassment, despite the exclusivity provisions of the Illinois Human Rights Act (the "Act").
Under the Act's exclusivity provision, courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims alleging civil rights violations because such claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Human Rights Commission (the "Commission"). In Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, the plaintiff sued her former employer for sexual harassment before the Commission. The plaintiff also sued her former employer in state court for the common law torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment, which she asserted arose out of the employer's harassing conduct. Interpreting the Illinois Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, the lower courts held that the plaintiffs common law tort claims were "Inextricably linked" with her claims of sexual harassment, and thus the state court did not have jurisdiction to hear these claims because of the exclusivity provisions. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed, finding that because the plaintiff could allege sufficient facts to establish each of the independent tort claims, the exclusivity provisions of the Act did not bar a state court from hearing these claims. In the Court's estimation, the sexual harassment aspect of the case was "merely incidental" to what were otherwise ordinary tort claims.
The Court held that assault, battery and false imprisonment have long been recognized as tort actions separate and apart from causes of action arising under the Act. Because the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the elements of each of the torts, without reference to any of the legal duties created by the Act, the Court determined that she had stated a cause of action for each independent of the Act. The Court therefore concluded that the tort claims were not "inextricably linked" so as to remove them from the circuit court's jurisdiction under the exclusivity provision.
The implications of this decision are somewhat disturbing. Whereas employers used to only have to defend against state law discrimination allegations on a single front before the Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision has seemingly opened the door for plaintiffs to pursue corresponding lawsuits for conduct arising out of the same alleged incident, just on a different theory. Employers may therefore be in store for additional litigation when a former employee sues alleging discrimination under the Act.