Determining what is considered a "disability" has always been the core of disputes under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). For example, if an individual has a potentially disabling condition that is easily corrected by a medical device or drug, can that person claim a disability under the ADA? Courts and the federal government had offered conflicting views on that question. In two rulings on the same day last month, however, the U.S. Supreme Court offered welcome guidance, holding that "mitigating factors" such as eyeglasses, other devices and medications should be considered in determining whether an individual is disabled under the ADA. In yet another ruling the same day, the Court upheld employers' rights to require employees to meet applicable federal safety regulations as a condition of employment.
In a fourth ruling on the same day, the Court outlined when punitive damages may be awarded against employers in discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Title VII). Clearly, June 22, 1999 was a banner day in labor and employment law.
Consider Mitigating Measures in Determining Disability Status
In Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4371 (June 22, 1999) and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4370 (June 22, 1999), the Court held that the analysis of whether an individual is disabled under the ADA must include a consideration of mitigating measures. This decision is contrary to prior decisions by the Third, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the interpretive guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In Sutton and Murphy, the Supreme Court decided that failing to consider mitigating measures in assessing an individual's disability status under the ADA is "an impermissible interpretation" of the Act.
In Sutton, plaintiffs Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton were twin sisters with severe myopia. They each had uncorrected vision of 20/200 in their right eyes and 20/400 in their left eyes. Their vision, however, was 20/20 and they functioned normally with corrective lenses. The plaintiffs applied for jobs as commercial airline pilots with United Air Lines, Inc. (United), but were rejected because their vision was not 20/100 or better in its uncorrected state.
Sutton and Hinton filed EEOC charges against United and eventually filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado alleging that United discriminated against them in violation of the ADA. The district court granted United's motion to dismiss, finding that because the plaintiffs' vision was 20/20 with corrective lenses they were not substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing and, therefore, not disabled under the ADA. The court also held that the plaintiffs were not regarded as disabled in the major life activity of working by United. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal under similar reasoning.
In Murphy, plaintiff Vaughn Murphy was hired by United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) as a truck mechanic. UPS required its mechanics to have commercial driver's licenses so they could test drive UPS vehicles and make emergency road calls. DOT regulations prohibit commercial licenses for drivers with "high blood pressure likely to interfere with a [driver's] ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely." Murphy was unable to obtain his commercial license because of severely high blood pressure, even though his condition was controlled with medication which allowed him to function normally. As a result, UPS fired Murphy and he filed a disability claim against UPS in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging discrimination under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment for UPS, finding that Murphy was not disabled under the ADA because he functioned normally when medicated. The court also held that UPS did not regard Murphy as disabled, but only as uncertified under the DOT regulations. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, relying on its reasoning in Sutton.
In upholding the Tenth Circuit's decisions, the Supreme Court held that evaluating people in their hypothetical uncorrected state, as directed by the EEOC, "is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA." The Court reasoned that because the ADA uses the phrase "substantially limits" in the present indicative verb form, "the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability." The Court stated that a person whose impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but a corrected impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity and that person is not disabled under the ADA.
The Court also pointed out that people who still have substantial limitations, despite the use of mitigating measures, would still meet the definition of disabled under the ADA, and that people whose conditions are fully corrected by mitigating measures could still be regarded as disabled in certain situations. These determinations, however, must be based on an individualized inquiry into the person's limitations taking into account the effects - both positive and negative - of any mitigating measures.
Refusal to Hire Truck Driver with Monocular Vision Did Not Violate ADA
In Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4371 (June 22, 1999), the Court ruled that an employer did not violate the ADA when it refused to hire a commercial truck driver with monocular vision who had obtained a waiver of federal vision standards. In Albertsons, the plaintiff, Hallie Kirkingburg, a commercial truck driver, was fired by Albertsons, Inc. (Albertsons) because his monocular vision meant he was unable to meet DOT vision safety requirements for commercial truck drivers. Albertsons fired Kirkingburg although Kirkingburg applied for and received a waiver from the standard vision requirements under a Federal Highway Administration program. Kirkingburg filed a claim of discrimination under the ADA against Albertsons in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The district court granted summary judgment to Albertsons, finding Kirkingburg was not qualified to perform the essential functions of the job. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that Kirkingburg's impairment was a covered disability because "the manner in which he sees" is significantly different "from the manner in which most people see." The appeals court also said that the ADA requires Albertsons to justify its use of the DOT vision standard as necessary to prevent "a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."
The Supreme Court reversed and held that it is unreasonable to demand that an employer defend federal safety visual acuity standards for truck drivers as a legitimate job qualification simply because of the existence of a governmental waiver program. More importantly, however, the Court further defined the analysis used in determining whether an individual is
disabled under the ADA. First, the Court held that monocular vision is not a per se disability under the ADA. The Court stated that in order to have an ADA-covered disability, individuals with monocular vision must provide evidence "that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial." Second, the Court stated that, in conjunction with its decisions in Sutton and Murphy, there is "no principled basis for distinguishing between [mitigating] measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems." Accordingly, when determining whether someone is disabled under the ADA, a court must not only consider any artificial mitigating measures which the individual utilizes, but also any internal adjustments the person's body has made to compensate for his or her impairment.
"Egregious" Employer Actions Not Necessary
For Plaintiff to Collect Punitive Damages
In Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4372 (June 22, 1999), the Supreme Court held that an employer's conduct does not have to be "egregious" in order for a plaintiff to collect punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which allows plaintiffs in Title VII and ADA cases to recover compensatory and punitive damages in intentional discrimination cases where they can prove that the employer engaged in discriminatory practices "with malice or reckless indifference" to federally protected rights. The Court held that a plaintiff may use the employer's egregious behavior as evidence it acted with "malice" or "reckless indifference" to the employee's federally protected rights against job discrimination. This decision vacated and remanded a decision by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia holding that punitive damages may only be awarded for egregious violations of employees' rights under Title VII.
In further defining the inquiry into an employer's liability for punitive damages, the Supreme Court stated that the inquiry "does not end with a showing of the requisite `malice or . . . reckless indifference.'" The Court held that employers cannot be held indirectly liable for punitive damages based on discriminatory decisions of managers that are in direct conflict with an employer's good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
This decision once again highlights the importance of maintaining a specific and effective policy against all forms of discrimination and harassment in the workplace which includes an appropriate complaint procedure so that employees who feel they are being subjected to inappropriate behavior need not confront the alleged harasser. Employers should also consider conducting periodic training sessions for its supervisors and all employees to increase their awareness on these important issues. Such affirmative steps will help demonstrate an employer's good faith efforts to comply with Title VII and may shield an employer from indirect liability for punitive damages from the intentional discriminatory acts of a manager.