In Chmielewski, the plaintiff was a salesperson for a sophisticated electronic machinery company. He was also an alcoholic who, as a result of his alcoholism, developed cirrhosis of the liver and underwent a liver transplant. As a result of the transplant surgery, the plaintiff had to take anti-rejection medication. Without this medication, the plaintiff would die or need another new liver. Other than the fact that he had to take anti-rejection medication, plaintiff admitted that he was in good health and fully functional.
After taking a six month medical leave to recover from the surgery, the plaintiff returned to work only to be terminated several months later for failure to meet his sales quotas. He sued his employer alleging that he was terminated because of his handicap. Xermac argued that the plaintiff was not handicapped under the HCRA because, with the aid of his anti-rejection medication, his postoperative condition did not substantially interfere with a major life activity. The plaintiff responded by arguing that he was indeed handicapped because without his anti-rejection medication, he would die. According to plaintiff, his postoperative condition did substantially limit his life.
The Michigan Supreme Court decided that the determination of whether an individual is handicapped within the meaning of the HCRA should be determined with regard to mitigating measures such as medication. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's determination that under the ADA, an individual's status should be determined not "as it presently exists, but as it would exist without regard to medication or other mitigating measures." Instead, the Court adopted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Gilday v Mecosta Co., 124 F3d 760 (CA 6, 1997), that ignoring the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures would effectively "eliminate[] the statutory requirement that an impairment 'substantially limit[]' a major life activity in order to constitute a disability." The Michigan Supreme Court stated that "[b]y limiting the HCRA's protection to individuals having conditions that actually impose substantial limitations, the standard preserves the high purpose of the act."
The Court noted, however, that in some circumstances, an individual's condition will be substantially limiting despite the use of medications, prosthetic devices, or other mitigating measures. In other words, the courts must analyze an individual's condition on a case by case basis. For example, an individual who uses a prosthetic limb might still be handicapped within the meaning of the HCRA, even though she functions quite well, if she can demonstrate that her ambulation is significantly impaired even with the use of the prosthetic device. The ultimate impact of the Court's decision in Chmielewski is that simply because a person is affected by a serious physical or mental condition does not always mean that the condition qualifies as a handicap or disability protected by the HCRA.