When is a low verdict "inadequate?"
Plaintiffs' decedent was an 18-year-old white, female, high school graduate. Following a wedding reception given by two defendants (the parents of the bride), at which her boyfriend, the third defendant, became intoxicated, he lost control of the vehicle in which she was a passenger and hit another car. His car caromed off, struck the curb, went airborne, hit a light pole and flipped over in an adjacent field. Plaintiffs' decedent was thrown from the vehicle, sustaining fatal injuries. Liability was a given, the issue was damages.The decedent's parents brought a wrongful death and survival action. The measure of damages in a death action is the pecuniary loss to the next of kin, while in a survival action the measure of damages is the loss to the decedent's estate. The plaintiffs' economist testified that the net economic loss to her estate was in the range of $232,400 to $571,659 (average annual salary of $18,643, multiplied by work-life expectancy of either 42.5 years, or 29.1 years, if the decedent had raised a family, less a 40-70% discount rate for personal consumption). The defendants did not produce their own expert, but merely cross-examined the plaintiffs' expert, drawing out the possible applicability of the higher discount rate and the lower work-life expectancy.
The jury returned a verdict finding against all defendants, assessing no fault to the decedent and awarding damages of $25,000. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' post-trial motions and entered judgment on the verdict.
The plaintiffs appealed and the Superior Court vacated the award as inadequate and remanded the case for a new trial on damages, only. The Supreme Court granted allocatur, then affirmed the Superior Court, holding that the verdict was grossly inadequate, "capricious" and "shocking." (1994 WL 498690 at 3, 5.) In his dissenting opinion, Justice Flaherty pointed out the seeming inconsistency between the legal principle that juries are free to believe or disbelieve opinion evidence presented by an expert witness, and the principle that, where the jury disbelieves such evidence and an appellate court finds it "shocking," the appellate court's evaluation of the evidence must prevail. He advocated that the "shock the conscience" standard be abandoned where the only inadequacy in the jury's award is that it reflects the jury's rejection of expert testimony that the appellate court would have accepted. (Kiser, et ux. v. Schulte, et al., 1994 WL 498690, Pa. Supreme Ct., 9/13/94.)
The question left by this opinion is at what level does the Court's conscience become "shocked." If plaintiffs' expert economic testimony is unrebutted, must the jury return a verdict for at least the low figure given by the economist? Or may they disbelieve the testimony by half? Or three quarters?
In contrast, the Superior Court found, in Carlson v. Bubash, 432 Pa. Super. 514, 639 A.2d 458 (1994), that a jury could appropriately reach a "compromise" verdict. The Court stated that a jury's right to compromise a verdict, "should not be limited to a mathematical allocation of negligence . . ." but extends to compromising the amount of the verdict before, or regardless of, its findings on the percentages of fault attributable to the parties. (Id. at 461.) It went on to hold that the jury's deter minations on damages are unfettered, short of irrationality.
In two other recent cases, the issue of the adequacy of a verdict was considered, both resulting in a low verdict being affirmed. Nudelman v. Gilbride, 647 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. 1994), and Peck v. Haberle, 642 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. 1994); (verdicts of $5,000 and $500 respectively, upheld.)
Change in statute does not necessarily permit introduction of expenses covered by insurance in motor vehicle cases
Also in Carlson, supra, the Court held that evidence of plaintiff's medical bills, paid by his auto carrier, were properly excluded as not probative of the nature and extent of his injuries. 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1772 (1990) provides that in personal injury actions involving motor vehicle accidents, a person who receives or is eligible for insurance benefits is "precluded from recovering the amounts of benefits paid or payable . . ." by such insurance. Prior to 1990, the statute read, "precluded from plead ing, introducing into evidence or recovering . . ." The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the 1990 amendment evidenced a legislative intent to allow the admission of evidence of such bills by the absence of the italicized phrase. (639 A.2d at 461.)Note: Posted articles are for general information only and should not be considered legal advice.