Trade dress claim under Lanham Act requires proof of secondary meaning.
The Supreme Court held on March 22, 2000 that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects a product's design (or "trade dress") only if the owner can prove that the trade dress has secondary meaning in the marketplace. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., the Court held unanimously that product design or "trade dress" cannot be inherently distinctive, and is protectible only if the owner shows that a competing trade dress may cause confusion about the origin of the product. The Court held that a trade dress will cause confusion with another only if the original trade dress has secondary meaning in the marketplace. The Court distinguished the Two Pesos case on the ground that it involved product packaging instead of product design. The Court recognized that this created a difficult distinction that courts will have to wrestle with in the coming years. The Court held that close cases should be resolved in favor of a product design classification, thus requiring secondary meaning.
Public university may charge activity fee for extracurricular speech as long as program is viewpoint neutral.
On March 22, 2000, the Supreme Court held in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth that the First Amendment allows a public university to charge its students an activity fee that is used to fund extracurricular speech, as long as the program being funded is viewpoint neutral. The Court rejected a challenge by students who did not agree with some of the political and ideological expression that was being funded.
FDA lacks authority to regulate sale of tobacco products
In a much-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court held on March 21, 2000 that the Food and Drug Administration does not have authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to regulate tobacco products as they are customarily marketed -- i.e., without claims of therapeutic benefit. By a 5-4 vote, the Court held in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. that Congress' regulation of tobacco products through other more specific statutes shows an intent that tobacco not be regulated through the FDCA. The Court also cited the FDA's longstanding position that it lacked jurisdiction over tobacco products -- a position that the FDA changed only in 1995.
Arbitration awards can be confirmed in any federal district that is appropriate under venue statute.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award can be brought in the federal district where the award was made. The question that has split lower courts over the years is whether that is the only district in which a party may bring such a motion. On March 21, 2000, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. that a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award can be brought in either the federal district in which the award was rendered, or in any other district in which venue is proper under the general jurisdiction and venue statutes.
RICO Statute of Limitations begins upon discovery of injury.
The statute of limitations governing claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) has produced a spate of Supreme Court opinions of late. The most recent resolved the question exactly when the limitations period begins to run. Some circuits held that the limitation period begins when the plaintiff discovers his injury. Other circuits (including the Eighth) held that the limitation period begins to run only when the plaintiff discovers both his injury and the "pattern of racketeering activity" that RICO requires the plaintiff to prove. On February 23, 2000, the Supreme Court unanimously sided with the former camp in Rotella v. Wood and held that the limitation period begins to run when the plaintiff discovers his injury; he need not discover the "pattern of racketeering activity" as well.
Individual may sue under Equal Protection Clause without showing membership in a class or group.
Grace Olech wanted the Village of Willowbrook, Illinois to hook her up to the municipal water system. The Village said fine -- as long as Olech agreed to give the Village a 33-foot easement, as opposed to the 15-foot easement required of other homeowners. Olech sued the Village, alleging that the 33-foot easement requirement was irrational and arbitrary. The Supreme Court unanimously held on February 23, 2000 in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech that Olech could pursue her claim even though she didn't allege that she was a member of a protected class or group. A person can sue under the Equal Protection Clause as a "class of one" as long as she alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.
Hawaii's restriction of voting to citizens with certain Hawaiian ancestry violates Fifteenth Amendment
Hawaii's Office of Hawaiian Affairs administers programs designed to benefit two subclasses of Hawaiian citizens: "native Hawaiians," who are descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, and "Hawaiians", which includes "native Hawaiians" as well as people who are descended from anyone inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. The Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs are elected, but not everyone in Hawaii can vote for them. The Hawaiian Constitution provides that only "Hawaiians" may vote in the election. On February 23, 2000, the Supreme Court held by a 7-2 vote that denying Hawaiian citizens without the requisite ancestry the right to vote for the Trustees of the OHA violates the Fifteenth Amendment because it denies the right to vote on account of race. Rice v. Cayetano.
Defense attorney's failure to file Notice of Appeal supports habeas relief only if defendant meets Strickland test.
On February 23, 2000, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Flores-Ortega that a criminal attorney's failure to file a notice of appeal on her client's behalf supports habeas relief only if the defendant can satisfy the Strickland standard for showing ineffective assistance of counsel (i.e., the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness AND that the deficient performance caused prejudice to the defendant). The Ninth Circuit had imposed a per se rule that an attorney's failure to file a notice of appeal without the defendant's consent is always ineffective assistance of counsel, and the Court rejected that rule.
States may restrict campaign contributions.
Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), courts and governments have struggled with the question of how much regulation of campaign contributions is too much. Some thought that the Supreme Court might overrule or severely restrict Buckley in a case this term that came to the Court from Missouri. That didn't happen. On January 24, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic principles of Buckley and held in a 6-3 decision that Missouri's limits on contributions to candidates for state office do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that a state does not have to produce empirical evidence of corrupt practices or bad public perception of campaign contributions in order to justify a limit on contributions. In addition, the Court remarked that the $1,000 ceiling on contributions to an individual candidate in an individual election that the Court approved in Buckley is not a magic number, implying that campaign finance restrictions must be judged on a case-by-case basis. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. Voting Rights Act does not bar preclearance of non-retrogressive redistricting plan even if enacted with discriminatory purpose
A voting rights dispute from Louisiana made its second trip to the Supreme Court. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits covered jurisdictions from enacting a change in voting qualifications, prerequisites, standards, practices, or procedures without preclearance from either the Attorney General or the federal district court in Washington, D.C. Section 5 authorizes preclearance if the proposed voting change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Relying on prior precedent holding that the "effect" prong of this test requires a retrogressive impact -- i.e., making minority voters worse off -- the Court held on January 24 in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board that Section 5 allows preclearance of a voting change that had no retrogressive impact, despite the fact that the change was enacted with discriminatory intent.
Disclaiming interest doesn't eliminate tax liability.
Disclaimer of an interest in an estate does not defeat a federal tax lien, even if the disclaimer is valid under state law. Federal law controls the question whether a taxpayer has a beneficial interest in property that is subject to levy for unpaid federal taxes. The case is Drye v. United States. The vote was 9-0. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion.
"Facial attack" on California law fails.
California passed a law restricting access to the addresses of people arrested by the police (some companies made money by selling the information to criminal lawyers and insurance companies). The plaintiff made a "facial attack" on the statute under the First Amendment, arguing that it was overbroad. The Supreme Court held that a facial overbreadth challenge was not appropriate because a "facial" challenge is a narrow exception to the usual rule that the person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it might be applied unconstitutionally to others. The only way the plaintiff could challenge the statute in this case is "as applied" to it. The case is Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp. The vote was 7-2.
No basis for suit if discrimination claims would not have changed outcome.
Francois Daiel Lesage, who is white, applied for the Ph.D. program in psychology at the University of Texas. The school considers race during the review process. The school denied his application, so he sued the school. The school replied that it would have rejected his application even if the admission process were completely colorblind because his test scores and letters of recommendation were not sufficient. The district court granted the school summary judgment, but the Fifth Circuit reversed and said that all that matters is whether the school rejected Lesage's application "in the course of operating a racially discriminatory admissions program," regardless whether the outcome would have been the same under a colorblind program. The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, commenting: "Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under Section 1983." The case was Texas v. Lesage.