The New Seatbelt Law: Will It Buckle Under Constitutional Attack?

On 23 March 1994, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted the Tennessee Automobile Safety Act of 1994. Among its provisions is an evidentiary rule codified at TCA Sect. 55-9-604, which provides in pertinent part:

This statute amended the former seatbelt law.1 The old law incorporated the term "contributory negligence", before Tennessee's landmark decision of McIntyre v. Balentine.2 After the McIntyre decision, there was confusion among the trial courts as to whether the seat belt law still barred introduction of non-use.4 The new law was intended to settle this confusion, however, and issue has arisen. Defense lawyers are laying siege to the statute by means of a constitutional attack.4

Defense lawyers have postulated a two-fold constitutional objection, each mutually exclusive but producing the same result. First, they assert that TCA Sect. 55-9-604 is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.5 Both the United States and Tennessee constitutions guarantee to each citizen equal protection of the laws. If a statute purposefully discriminates against a suspect class of citizens, then the courts will carefully scrutinize the statute to determine whether the statutory classification violates the constitution. The Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation of its own constitution has faithfully tracked the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constititution.6

Therefore, U.S. Constitutional cases are aids to interpret the Tennessee Constitution.

Where an Equal Protection objection is voiced, the courts must parse the offending statute to find a class. Unless a suspect classification is based on race, gender, alienage, or illegitimacy, the standard of review for the statute is the rational basis test.7 When a fundamental right is not implicated, courts demand only that a statutorily created classification have a "rational basis".8 The rational basis test requires merely that the statute bear a reasonable relation to a valid legislative objective.9 If the legislation is social or economic in nature, then the Equal protection Clause allows the state great latitude to choose its policy initiative.10 Therefore, "The initial discretion to determine what is 'different' and what is the 'same' resides in the legislatures of the States".11

In determining whether a rational basis exists for upholding a statute, the burden of showing that a classification is unreasonable and arbitrary is placed upon the individual challenging the statute.12 If any state of facts can "reasonably be conceived" to justify the classification, or if the unreasonableness of the class is "fairly debatable", then the statute must be upheld.13 As a result, if the classification has a foundation in reason, then the courts must uphold the statute.14

Careful scrutiny of TCA Sect. 55-9-604 reveals that the only class, which arguably may receive "different" treatment, is the product liability manufacturer.15 However, a classification, which potentially benefits a product manufacturer and/or its insurer, will not receive heightened scrutiny. Purposeful discrimination in favor of those who place their products in the stream of commerce is a classification of wealth; hence no suspect class is implicated. Therefore, the constitutionality of the statute depends on whether it has a reasonable relation to a valid legislative objective.16

Tortfeasors other than product manufacturers have successfully argued that the statute is arbitrary and unreasonable.17 They claim that the seatbelt law is an aberration when compared to other cases. For instance, a motorcycle operator who fails to wear a crash helmet can charged with contributory negligence if the failure to wear that helmet was the proximate cause of his injury.18 Other illustrations are wide and varied.19 Prophylactic equipment, as it relates to personal injury, is always an issue in comparative fault cases. Therefore, the defense bar asserts that the statute arbitrarily protects product manufacturers, hence violating the constitution.

In addition, the defense bar strikes a jab at the logic supporting the seatbelt law. After adoption of comparative fault principles, the defense bar vehemently argues that it would be absurd for the legislature to allow relevant evidence of plaintiff's fault to be admitted only in certain circumstances. Such an absurdity would lend itself to a finding that the statute has no reasonable relation to a legitimate legislative objective;20 therefore, such a finding would jeopardize the statute's constitutionality for want of a rational basis.

Despite the legal as well as logical salvos launched by the defense bar, the stature is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause. A rational basis requires only a minor threshold of explanations to trigger a finding of constitutionality.21

First and foremost, TCA Sect. 55-9-604 is not absurd or arbitrary, because it clearly protects a class of citizens' right to compensation. The statute is reasonably related to this legitimate objective. The State of Tennessee has inherent police powers to regulate the conduct and consequences of motor vehicle usage. The Legislature is afforded great latitude in exercising its police powers.22 The seatbelt law reduces the expenses of litigation by preventing the costs of auto accident experts in a substantial majority of cases. In this era when tort reformers constantly assail the costs of litigation, a law that actually reduces those costs should surely find safe haven in the defense bar.

Another legitimate objective is the inadmissibility of speculative evidence.23 Conjectural and speculative evidence are conjoined to the requirement of certainty when damages are sought. Nebulous arguments as to whether an accident victim would have lived or died, with or without his seatbelt, are generally far too uncertain to be relevant. In any event, the General Assembly is the constitutional arbiter of these policy objectives, not the courts. Therefore, promulgation of standards requiring tangible evidence is a legitimate purpose to support the new seatbelt law.

Perhaps more compelling are the numerous state legislatures, which have determined that the failure to wear a seatbelt shall not be introduced as evidence in civil litigation. At least 21 state legislatures have enacted similar legislation, and seven of them have adopted modified comparative fault akin to our own.24 Therefore, the new seatbelt law enacted by our General assembly emulates well-established rules of evidence in our sister states.

Without begging the question, the plaintiff must justify the distinction between product liability claims and the typical negligence claims arising from an auto accident. The new seatbelt law patently permits admissibility under certain conditions in the former, while universally barring said evidence in the latter. Without addressing the applicability of the doctrine of elision,25 a justifiable explanation exists for the classification that favors product manufacturers.

Strict liability is still the theory of product liability claims in Tennessee. In this state, as in many other jurisdictions, contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff is not a bar to recovery in a suit based upon strict liability in tort.26 Liability is not based on ordinary negligence, but upon the consideration of protecting the public from the dangerous or defective products placed into the stream of commerce.27 Therefore, in product liability cases, the focus of inquiry is upon the defendant's product, as opposed to the plaintiff's conduct.

Hypothetically speaking, suppose the plaintiff's vehicle struck a retaining wall at a high rate of speed. The plaintiff was injured and sued the car manufacturer for a defective seatbelt mechanism. It would be unfair to prevent the manufacturer from proving, as a proximate cause element, that the plaintiff was not wearing the seatbelt that he claims is defective, in the first place. While this is not indicative of all product liability claims that may involve a seatbelt, it is a "conceivable" explanation that supports the constitutionality of the seatbelt statute.

Defendants have further proposed a second constitutional objection that the Automobile Safety Act of 1994 violates the Due Process Clause of the 14^th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sect. 8, of the Tennessee Constitution. Both of these constitutional provisions are interpreted synonymously by Tennessee courts.28 In sum, the Due Process Clause provides that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.29 The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires that every litigant have an opportunity to present every available defense.30

The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a law as unconstitutional because it precluded an employer from presenting evidence relevant to his defense in a social security hearing.31 This court went further to state that every litigant has a due process right under both the state and federal constitutions to have his "day in court".32 Therefore, authority exists to support the contention that a legal defense is a liberty interest subject to the Due Process Clause of the federal and Tennessee constitutions.

The frailty of this attack upon the constitutionality of the seatbelt law is two-fold. First of all, no fundamental right is implicated by defense of a civil lawsuit. As a result, the rational basis test once again govern the standard of review applied by the courts.33 The extent to which a party prosecutes or defends a claim is courts is often the derivative of legislative action. Enactment of the Rape Shield Law and the Medical Malpractice Act are examples of public policy decisions which emanate from legislative debate.34 A rational basis conceived to justify a litigant's procedural choices is a predicate to affirm the constitutionality of an evidentiary statute.35 Therefore, legislative objectives espoused in favor of the seatbelt statute scuttle the due process assault.

In contrast to the rational basis test, a second, more logical hurdle stands in the way of the defense bar. In all respects, the new seatbelt law is a procedural rule of evidence. As such, the new law merely affects the manner in which a defendant prosecutes his/her comparative fault claim. Rules of Evidence are the machinery, as opposed to the product.36 The defense of comparative fault is always available to the defendant, notwithstanding the adoption of the new seatbelt law. Therefore, the new seatbelt law deprives no claim or defense. Hence, there is no standing for a due process attack.

Conclusion

Since the adoption of McIntyre, the seatbelt law has been challenged with great ferocity by the defense bar. As is their right, defense attorneys are simply attempting to abate the liability of their clients. They justify the challenge by are constitutional axioms that are the legal vernacular for "fairness". Nevertheless, because a law operates to the detriment of one party does not, by definition, mean it is unconstitutional. The heightened evidentiary standards and contiguous-state rule pressed upon plaintiffs by the General Assembly in medical malpractice cases are just as constitutional as the new seatbelt law. Legislative objectives were weighed and balanced to produce the new seatbelt law. Therefore, the courts need only recognize those policy objectives as the benchmark of a constitutional statute.

Footnotes

1 See TCA Sect. 55-9-604 (TN Supp. 1993). The former law provided, "In no event shall failure to wear a safety belt be considered as contributory negligence, nor shall such failure to wear a safety belt be admissible as evidence in a trial of any civil action".

2 833 SW2d 52 (TN 1992).

3 Brdar v. Bob Frensley Ford, Tr.Ct. 91C-3218, Davidson County. Judge Hamilton Gayden of the First Circuit ruled that the term "contributory negligence" poisoned the statute in light of the McIntyre decision, and therefore, held that the statute was inapplicable where the evidence was relevant. The judge was receptive to an interlocutory appeal.

4 Walker v. Adams, Tr.Ct., Davidson County. Judge Barbara Haynes ruled that the new seatbelt law was unconstitutional. Stuart Scott of Stewart, Estes & Donnell proposed the theory that the law violated his client's constitutional rights. Peter Klett and John Anderson of the same firm proposed this theory in the Brdar case.

5 Amendment 14 of the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part that no state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. The Tennessee constitutional counterpart is the Class Legislation Clause found in Article 11, Sect. 8, which provides in pertinent part that the Legislature shall have no power to pass any law that grants to any individual rights, privileges, immunities or exemptions.

6 Tenn. Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 SW2d 139, 152-54 (Tenn. 1993).

7 Bates v. Alexander, 749 SW2d 742, 743 (TN 1988); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 16 (1973).

10 City of Cleburne, TX v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 440 (1985).

11 Plyer v. Doe, 457 US 202, 216 (1982).

12 Harrison, at 826.

13 Id.

14 Phillips v. State, 304 SW2d 614, 617 (TN 1957).

15 Tenn. Code Ann. 55-9-604(a)(1). An exception is provided to the general prohibition of admissibility of seatbelt non-use. This exception allows the party defending a products liability claim to argue for admissibility of seatbelt non-use if, and only if, a "causal relationship between non-compliance and the injuries alleged" is proven by preponderance of evidence and is relevant in accordance with Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

16 Harrison, at 825.

17 See Wessinger v. So. Railway Co., 470 FSupp 930 (D.S.C. 1979). A railway crossing statute limiting the Railroad Company to a defense of gross contributory negligence, as opposed to simple contributory negligence, was found unconstitutional. The district court opined that the statute only penalized railroads, while other tortfeasors were allowed to defend on the basis of simple contributory negligence; and that the statute was purely arbitrary, because the difference between railroads and other tortfeasors could "no longer withstand constitutional challenge under the equal protection clause". Id., at 933. See Walker v. Adams, supra.

18 Brown v. Smith, 604 SW2d 56 (TN Ct.App. 1980). The Court of Appeals held that a passenger's failure to wear a crash helmet on a motorcycle had to be causally related to the injuries he sustained as a result of the accident. Id., at 59.

19 Examples include: failure of a construction worker to wear a hard hat, failure of a boater to wear a life preserver, etc.

20 As a rule of statutory construction, it is presumed that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. SEC v. Ambassador Church Finance, 670 F2d 608, 611 (5^th Cir. 1982).

21 See Fn. 9-10, supra.

22 Cleburne, at 440.

23 See Ramrattan v. Burger King Corp., 656 FSupp 522, 527 (D.MD. 1987), wherein the court forbade introduction of seatbelt non-use and stated: "The problem of conjectural damages cannot be dismissed lightly when the question is what would have been the extent of injury had the seatbelt been used, and what happened because the seatbelt was not used." Id.

24 See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 SW2d 52, 57, Fn. 6. The legislatures of Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Utah, and North Dakota have statutes that still prohibit the introduction of such evidence, despite their adoption of comparative fault principles.

25 The doctrine of elision requires the courts of this state to delete constitutional provisions of a statute and uphold the rest of it, if possible. This doctrine operates in much the same way as a severe ability clause. Lowes Comp. Inc., v. Cardwell, 813 SWd2d 428, 438 (Tenn. 1991).

26 Norman v. Fisher Marine, 672 SW2d 414, 419 (TN App. 1984).

27 Id.

28 State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 596 SW2d 779, 786 (Tenn. 1980).

29 Article I, Sect. 8, of the Tennessee Constitution differs slightly from the United States Constitution, in that it states that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. This is often known as the "Law of the Land" clause.

30 Lindsay v. Norment, 405 US 56 (1972).

31 Juster Bros., Inc., v. Christgau, 7 NW2d 501, 507-508 (Minn. 1953).

32 Id.

33 See Bendner v. Carr, 532 NE2d 178 (OH App. 1987). The Ohio Court of Appeals upheld an Ohio statute that provided that evidence of non-use of a seatbelt "shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal action...". Id., at 181. The court applied a substantive due process analysis under the rational basis test, and concluded that the statute was reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose. As long as the statute bears a "reasonable relation to a legislative purpose", then there is no due process violation. Nebbia v. New York, 291 US 502, 507 (1934).

34 See Jones v. Five Star Engineering, Inc., 717 SW2d 882, 883 (1986).

35 Estren v. Moss, 430 SW2d 345 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 US 318 (1968).

36 See Saylors v. Riggsbee, 544 SW2d 609, 610 (Tenn. 1976).