A. WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
1.BAD FAITH:
a.United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267 (Tex., July 9, 1997): The court held that a workers' compensation carrier was not liable for bad faith in denying a surviving spouse's claim for benefits where the denial was based upon its interpretation of a Texas Workers' Compensation Commission rule, and the interpretation was at least arguable since three of the five TWCC reviewing officers shared that interpretation.
b.Alvarado v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 951 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi, August 28, 1997): Where the evidence established that workers' compensation claimants were independent contractors and not employees of the insured when they were injured in an automobile accident while riding in the insured's vehicle, the insured's workers' compensation carrier did not deny their claim in bad faith as a matter of law.
2.EXCLUSIVE REMEDY:
Williams v. Brown & Root, Inc., 947 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App. - Texarkana, June 6, 1997): Where the owner of a project, acting as a contractor, entered into a subcontract with a second contractor and actually paid workers' compensation insurance premiums for the subcontractor's employees, the second contractor was protected by a provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act extending tort immunity to the general contractor for injuries to a subcontractor's employees. The court noted that the statute does not prescribe the manner of provision or payment of workers' compensation coverage as long as that coverage is provided; and that the subcontractor, who was provided insurance under the contract between the first and second contractors, was barred from maintaining a common law negligence action against the second contractor.
3. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS:
a. Anderson v. Hood County, _____ S.W.2d _____, 1997 WL 721663 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth, November 20, 1997): The court held that a county jail employee did not have good cause as a matter of law for failing to timely file her notice of injury where she claimed that she sustained post-traumatic stress disorder due to her witnessing one inmate stab and kill another inmate. The evidence established that although the plaintiff's disorder had not been diagnosed, she had learned that there was a connection between her condition and her witnessing a murder more than thirty days (the statutory notice period) before filing her claim for compensation.
b.Simplex Electric Corp. v. Holcomb, 949 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App. - Austin, July 3, 1997, review requested): The court held that the inadvertent failure of a workers' compensation carrier to contest the compensability of a workers' compensation claim by the sixty-day statutory deadline did not give the insured employer standing to contest compensability thereafter. The court stated that allowing the employer to challenge compensability after the deadline had expired would contravene the purpose of the limitations period.
c.Manasco v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 951 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App. - Beaumont, August 28, 1997): The court held that a workers' compensation claimant, who sought to reopen the issues of maximum medical improvement and impairment rating based upon a change in his condition, could appeal to the district court the issue of compensability based upon a change in his condition and increase in his impairment even though he had failed to give a notice of appeal to the TWCC appeals panel within fifteen days after the contested case hearing officer's decision.
4. SUBROGATION:
Employers Casualty Co. v. Dyess, _____ S.W.2d _____, 1997 WL 694779 (Tex. App. - Amarillo, November 7, 1997, review requested) (not yet reported): The court held that a workers' compensation carrier had a statutory right of subrogation against an uninsured motorist carrier which had provided benefits to the claimant, who was driving a truck belonging to his employer in the course of his employment when he was struck by an uninsured motorist. The court rejected the argument that the only third parties against whom a compensation carrier's subrogation rights are effective are tortfeasors. The court also held that a clause in the uninsured motorist carrier's policy stating that coverage did not apply for the benefit of any insurer under a workers' compensation law was invalid because it conflicted with the carrier's statutory right of subrogation.
5. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE:
Porterfield v. Galen Hosp. Corp., Inc., 948 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App. - San Antonio, June 18, 1997, review requested): The court held that the plaintiff presented evidence to raise a fact issue as to whether she was terminated from her employment in retaliation for having filed a workers' compensation claim where the employer submitted the claim with a notation that the claim was not compensable, the insurance company determined that the claim was compensable, the insurance company notified the claimant on a Friday afternoon that coverage was available, and the claimant was fired on the following Monday. The court stated that the alleged dispute over coverage as well as the close proximity between the filing of the claim and the dismissal raised a fact issue as to whether, without filing her claim, the claimant would have been dismissed.
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS:
1.Porterfield v. Galen Hosp. Corp., Inc. , 948 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App. - San Antonio, June 18, 1997, review requested): The court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of an employer on a claim brought by a discharged employee for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that theemployee2. S.W. Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Franco, 951 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi, August 21, 1997, review requested) (en banc): In a suit brought by former employees against their former employer for retaliatory termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court held that evidence which supported a finding that the employer had violated the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act by terminating the plaintiffs for complaining of sexual harassment and that the terminations caused the plaintiffs emotional distress was sufficient to support a finding that the employer engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of the plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.